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THE INTERNATIONAL DOLPHIN CONSERVATION ACT OF 1992:
UNREASONABLE EXTENSION OF O.S. JURISDICTION IN THE
EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC OCEAN (ETP) FISHERY
I. INTRODUCTION: Dolphin mortality in the ETP
Since the early I960' 8, one of the roost controversial and emotional
wildlife issues addressed by Congress has been the dispute over incidental
dolphin mortality 2 in the ETP tuna fishery. 3 For reasons that are not
entirely clear, dolphins and schools of yellowfin tuna frequently associate in
the ETP. 4 Because dolphins are easy to spot as they swim along the ocean's
surface, tuna fishermen have traditionally relied on the tuna-dolphin bond to
locate large schools of yellowfin tuna. 5 Prior to 1959, this technique of
locating tuna did not pose a serious threat to dolphins because the primary
commercial method used to harvest yellowfin tuna was the "line-and-pole.
"
6
The threat to dolphins increased dramatically in 1959, however, with the
introduction of purse seine nets to the ETP tuna fishery. This new technology
!The Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) is a 7 Billion square Bile area of the Pacific Ocean "bounded by 40
e
N. latitude, 40' S. latitude, 160° H. longitude, and the coastlines of North, Central and South ABerica." 50
C.F.P. §216.3 (1991).
incidental dolphin Bortality is caused prisarily by the use of purse-seine nets to fish for yellowfin
tuna in the ETP and the use of driftnets to fish for tuna in other fisheries. INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, TUNA:
CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING THE U.S. INDUSTRY, REPORT TO THE SENATE COBBITTEE OF FINANCE, U.S. INT'L TRADE COBB N
PUB. No. 2547 (Aug. 1992). This paper sill only discuss dolphin Bortality associated with purse 6eine fishing
in the ETP.
3/d. ; 138 CONG. REC. H9064-02, H9067 (1992).
Because yellowfin tuna and certain species of dolphins share a siailar diet, one theory suggests that the
bond is related to feeding. U.S. INT'L TRADE COBB'N PUB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
556 Fed. Reg. 4981 (1991).
*This Bethod of fishing relies primarily on the use of hooks to catch tuna. After locating a school of
fish, ground bait is thrown over the side to attract the tuna towards the vessel. As the tuna begin to feed on
the baitfish, unbaited hooks are thrown into the water. Lacking the intelligence and built-in sonar of the
dolphin, the tuna bite anything in the water, including the unbaited hooks. The dolphins, on the other hand,
eat only the baitfish. 45 Fed. Reg. 72178 (1980); Conner, fie Conversion of Starsist, The San Francisco
Chronicle, Jun. 17, 1990; I. Holland, Exploitation on Porpoise: The Vse of Purse Seine Nets by Coatercial tuna
Fisnerten in the Eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, 17 SYRACUSE J. IHT'L L. ft COM. 267 (1991).

proved to be ten tiroes more productive in catching tuna than the "line-and-
pole" method. 7 However, it also brought with it an unwelcomed and serious
rise in incidental dolphin mortality. 8 It is estimated that, since 1959,
approximately 7.5 million dolphins have died in purse seine-related deaths in
the ETP9 . The majority of those deaths, approximately 6.8 million, were
caused by the U.S. tuna fleet during the 1960 's and 1970 's.i
Public outrage in the U.S. over the high level of dolphin mortality in
the ETP prompted a massive legislative effort to reduce the number of dolphin
deaths associated with the domestic and foreign tuna fleets. The result was
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972. l* The immediate goal of
the Act was to reduce "the incidental kill or . . . serious injury of marine
mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing operations ... to
insignificant levels approaching ..." zero. 12 Continued concern over U.S.
and foreign commercial fishing practices resulted in amendments to the MMPA in
'Conner, supra note 6.
'Purse seine fishing involves the use of deep-sailed, nylon webbed nets, soee of which reach depths of
over 500 fathois. After the nets are placed in the ocean, dolphins are herded into the area U6ing helicopters,
speed boats and Class C explosives. The dolphins are then intentionally encircled with the nets. The bottoi
of the nets are then winched closed by steel cables to prevent the tuna froi escaping to deeper water. As a
result, a nuiber of dolphins are also trapped within the net. The walls of the "purse" are then tightened and
a second net is used to reiove the tuna froi the water. However, before hauling the tuna onboard, efforts are
lade to release any dolphins that reiain within the "purse". Notwithstanding these efforts, soie aniials
inevitably becoie entangled in the nets and drown. Others are injured in the process and subsequently die froe
their injuries or are killed by sharks. 1. Holland, supra note 6; J. Brooke, 10 nations Eeach Accord on Saving
Dolphins, The New York Tines, Bay 12, 1992, at C4, col. 1; 138 Cong. Bee. H9064-02, E9070 (1992); O.S. INT'
L
TRADE COMH'N POB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
»0.S. INT'L TRADE COBK'N POB. No. 2547, supra note 2, at Table 3-1.
"Id.
H16 D.S.C. §§1361 et seq. (1992). Note that the HHPA is not liiited to the protection of dolphins, but
rather protects all foris of larine lanals.
1216 D.S.C. 01371(a)(2) (1992).

1981, 1984 and 1988 to afford marine mammals further protections under the
Act . i
3
Despite the progress made under the MMPA to reduce dolphin mortality,
public dissatisfaction in the U.S. with the continued killing of dolphins
resulted in consumer boycotts against canned tuna products. In response, the
three major U.S. tuna processors- Starkist, Van Camp-Chicken of the Sea, and
Bumblebee- announced in April 1990 that they would only sell dolphin-safe tuna
in the U.S. 14 Congress built on this voluntary "dolphin-safe" policy by
passing the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA) of 1990. The
DPCIA established national labelling standards for dolphin-safe tuna. 15
Subsequently, court-ordered tuna embargoes were imposed between 1990 and 1992
against harvesting and intermediary nations that had failed to comply with the
comparability standards of the MMPA. 16 The net effect of the MMPA, the
dolphin-safe policy, the DPCIA labelling scheme and the court-ordered
embargoes has been a significant reduction in dolphin mortality, as well as
the elimination of almost all dolphin-unsafe tuna from the U.S. market. 17
13 Soee of the new protection leasures included: an annual kill quota of 20,500 dolphins for the U.S. tuna
fleet (1981); potential tuna eibargoes against nations that did not have a coiparable dolphin conservation
prograi (1984); perforiance standards for tuna boat captains to reduce dolphin Bortality and a 100 percent
observer prograi on O.S. tuna boats (1988). 16 D.S.C. §§1361 et seq. (1992); 50 CF.fi. §216.24 (1991).
1*138 Cong. Bee. S17840-05, S17841 (1992).
15138 Cong. Rec. B9064-02, B9067 (1992); 16 D.S.C. §1385 (1992).
^Earth Island Institute v. Hosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Earth Island Institute v.
Hosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991); Earth Island Institute v. Hosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal.
1992).
I'Pre-BHPA dolphin lortality in the FTP peaked at 534,000 deaths in 1961. 57 Fed. Reg. 27010, Table 2
(1992). By 1991, dolphin »ortality in the FTP had been reduced to approximately 25,000 deaths, only 1005 of
which sere caused by O.S. tuna boats. 138 Cong. Bee. B9064-02, B9070 (1992).

Unfortunately, the MMPA embargoes and DPCIA labelling scheme have caused
friction with some of our closest allies and trading partners. Mexico,
Venezuela and the European Community (EC) have each challenged the embargoes
and labelling scheme as unfair trade practices before the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . In September 1991, a dispute panel reviewing the
Mexican complaint found that the U.S. embargoes (but not the labelling scheme)
was GATT- il legal. 18 Notwithstanding these disputes, a significant
breakthrough occurred at the international level in April 1992. At a special
meeting of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the ETP
harvesting nations joined in a multilateral agreement that will reduce dolphin
mortality from 19,500 in 1993 to less than 5,000 per year by 1999.19
Despite this noteworthy achievement by the IATTC, Congress elected to
amend the MMFA and, in October 1992, the President signed into law the
International Dolphin Conservation Act (IDCA) of 1992.20 The IDCA
establishes new standards for dolphin protection including, inter alia: a 5-
year global moratorium on the use of purse seine nets to intentionally
encircle dolphins in order to harvest tuna. 21 To encourage compliance with
these new measures, the IDCA allows the Secretary of the Treasury to lift
existing tuna embargoes for any state that agrees to abide by the moratorium.
i»The IC and Venezuelan coiplaints are pending revies. 138 Cong. Pec. B9064-02, H9069 (1992).
15 Inter-Aierican Tropical Tuna Comission Agreeient, June 1992 (La Jolla, California). The parties to the
agreeeent are: Coluibia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panaia, Spain, the O.S., Vanuatu, and
Venezuela. IATTC Agreeient, app. I; U.S. IHT'L TRADE COHH'N PUBLICATION 2547, supra note 2.
2«Pub. L. No. 102-523 (1992).
2 lOther dolphin protection provisions of the IDCA include: an international research prograi to develop
new fishing equipient and techniques that are dolphin-safe and a landatory dolphin-safe tuna larket for the
U.S. by June 1994. Id.

If a nation subsequently fails to comply with its commitments under the IDCA,
the Secretary can impose a more onerous embargo, not only against yellowfin
tuna harvested in the ETP, but also against any fish and fish products
produced by the noncomplying state. 22
This new legislative attempt to further extend U.S. dolphin conservation
efforts in the ETP raises several interesting jurisdictional questions. Does
international law provide a basis of jurisdiction for such unilateral
regulation of domestic and foreign fishing activities in the ETP? If such a
basis exists, will the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulate
foreign fishing practices in the ETP nevertheless be inconsistent with the
international legal system? More specifically, even if the U.S. is not
precluded from applying its laws extraterritorially , are U.S. conservation
interests outweighed by the political, economic, social and sovereignty
concerns of the other ETP harvesting states?
This paper will answer these questions by examining the practical and
legal implications of extending the IDCA extraterritorially. A brief
historical overview of U.S. fishery management and ocean policy regarding
highly migratory species will be provided as background information.
Similarly, a review of domestic and international efforts to manage tuna
stocks and protect dolphins in the ETP will be provided. The extraterritorial
extension of U.S. jurisdiction under the IDCA will then be examined under the
reasonableness test of the Restatement (Tliird) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States §403 (1986). As will be demonstrated herein, a balancing of
the interests involved weighs heavily against unilaterally extending the IDCA
nid.

beyond the U.S. exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A reasonable alternative to
the IDCA will, therefore, be offered in conclusion.
II. U.S. FISHERY MANAC3MENT: A Historical Overview
A. The Truman Proclamation of 1945
On September 28, 1945, President Truman took the unprecedented step of
unilaterally establishing fishery conservation zones over high seas areas
contiguous to the U.S. coast 23 In these zones, the U.S. was to exercise
exclusive regulatory control over areas that had been traditionally fished by
U.S. nationals alone. Areas traditionally used by both U.S. and foreign
fishermen would be regulated by bilateral agreements. Additionally, the
Proclamation recognized the right of other coastal states to establish similar
conservation zones provided they were consistent with the U.S. claims.
Although the proclamations indicated that freedom of navigation would
not be affected in the zones, the unintended result of this unilateral
extension of jurisdiction was a new era of expansive maritime claims by the
international community. Citing the Truman Proclamations as authority, Chile,
Ecuador and Peru signed the Declaration of Santiago in 1952 and established
200 nautical mile maritime zones . In these zones , each nation claimed
exclusive sovereign jurisdiction, not only over the resources in the zone, but
also the water column. 24 Other nations soon followed suit with similar
i* Policy of the United States With Bespect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the Bigh Seas, Sep.
28, 1945, Presidential Proclaiation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945). A second proclaiation issued on the
sale day extended jurisdiction over the natural resources of the U.S. continental shelf. Policy of the United
States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Sep. 28,
1945, Presidential Proclaiation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. §67 (1943-1948 Coipilations).
*«T. Clingan, Jr., EMerging Las of the Sea: ?he Econotic lone Dilena, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 530-547
(1977); E. Richardson, Power, Hobility and the Las of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 902-919 (1980).

declarations
. The potential result of these claims was a serious threat to
freedom of navigation and overflight in areas that had traditionally been
considered part of the high seas. 25
B. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
Continued concern over depletion of coastal fish stocks prompted
Congress to take further unilateral action to protect U.S. fishing interests
beyond the territorial sea. With the enactment of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) of 1976, Congress established a broad
200-mile Fisheries Conservation Zone (FCZ) in which the U.S. claimed exclusive
management authority over all fish stocks found in the zone, except highly
migratory species. 28 With regard to highly migratory species, the MFCMA
authorized the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with other nations
"for the purpose of entering into international fishery agreements ... [to]
provide for the conservation and management ..." of such species throughout
their range. 27
Although well-intended, the MFCMA had an adverse impact on U.S. ocean
policy goals. In the short-term, the timing of the Act preempted the
25 In effect, what these states sere claiiing was a 200-iile territorial sea. Such claies are significant
because foreign vessels only enjoy a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of another state.
Additionally, a right of overflight does not exist in the airspace above the territorial sea. If all coastal
states sere to clais 200-iile territorial seas, freedo* of navigation and overflight rights critical for U.S.
ilitary and coiiercial needs would be adversely affected.
2516 D.S.C. §§1801 et seq. (1992). Highly ligratory species, such as tuna, do not live in any defined
area of water. Therefore, until 1990, the U.S. laintained that no state had a paraiount interest in lanaging
such stocks, even when found within a state's exclusive econoiic zone (EEZ). As discussed below, the U.S.
aiended the MFCMA in 1990 to place tuna found within the U.S. EEZ under exclusive U.S. ianage»ent jurisdiction.
U.S. IHT'L TRADE COMM'H PUB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
"16 U.S.C. §§1812, 1822 (1992).

conclusion of a promising agreement with several Latin American states to
multilaterally regulate tuna stocks in the ETP. 28 It additionally undercut
U.S. efforts at the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea to obtain consensus
on international standards for the conservation and management of highly
migratory species. 29 In response to the MFCMA, several countries
immediately extended their fishery jurisdictions out to 200-miles. 30 Unlike
the MFCMA, however, many of these claims asserted jurisdiction over highly
migratory species. 3 * In the long-run, the MFCMA was relied on by a number
of states to make more expansive maritime claims. 32 By 1990, 13 states
claimed 200-mile territorial seas, 21 states claimed 200-mile fishery zones,
and another 80 nations claimed 200-mile EEZs. 33 The MFCMA also demonstrated
U.S. willingness (repeated in the IDCA) to enact fishery legislation
inconsistent with its existing international treaty obligations. Arguably,
the Act violated U.S. commitments under the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, the 1958 Geneva
28 J. Moore, Foreign Policj and Fidelity to Lav. the inatoty of a treaty Violation, 70 AMER. J. INT'L. L.
802-808 (1976).
»J. Kindt, Overall Goals for Protecting the Earine Snvironaent, 2 JOHN HABBEN KINDT, MABINE POLLUTION AND
THE LAN OE THE SEA 673, 675-708 (1986).
38 These states included: Norway, Mexico, Canada, France, Guateiala, Japan, Spain, India, Sri Lanka, and
Senegal. T. Clingan, Jr., supra note 24.
310. S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N POB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
32 J. Kindt, supra note 29. These claiis Here lade despite language in the MECMA which indicated that the
traditional high seas freedois of navigation and overflight would not be iipeded in the ECZ. 16 D.S.C. §1801
(1992).
** Annotated Supplement to the Coteander's Handbook on the Lav of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare
Publication (HUP) 9 (Rev. A)/Eleet Marine Eorce Manual (EMFM) 1-10, of 5 October 1989, Table ST1-5.
8





C. U.S. KEZ Proclamation of 1983
In July 1982, the U.S. eliminated any further hope of reaching
international consensus on the issue of fishery management by declaring that
it would not sign the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).3 5
Less than a year later, however, the President announced that the non-seabed
portions of the LOSC reflected customary international law and that the U.S.
would accordingly exercise its maritime rights and duties consistent with
those provisions. 36 He concurrently declared that the U.S. was establishing
a 200-mile EEZ consistent with international law. 37
For the most part, the U.S. EEZ Proclamation paralleled the EEZ concept
established in Part, V of the LOSC. Within this new zone, the U.S. claimed to
exercise "sovereign rights for the purpose of . . . exploiting, conserving and
managing natural resources, both living and non-living, of the seabed and
subsoil and the superjacent waters . . . . " 38 The MFCMA was amended
3 <Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources on the High Seas (1958), 17 D.S.T.
138, T.I.A.S. Ho. 5969, 559 O.H.T.S. 285, Articles 1, 7 and 9-12; Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958), 13
D.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. Ho. 5200, 450 O.H.T.S. 83, Articles 2, 6 and 22; J. Soore, supra note 28.
35 The priiary justification given for this decision was that the deep seabed «ining provisions of the
Convention sere contrary to D.S. interests. Statetent of United States Ocean Policy, March 10, 1983, 1 FOB.
PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN: 1983, at 378-379 (1984).
nn
31 Exclusive Sconoaic lone of the United States of iterica, March 10, 1983 (Presidential Proclaiation No.
5030), 1 POB. PAPERS: ROHALD REAGAN: 1983, at 380 (1984).
3 »Hothing in the Proclaiation, however, was intended to interfere with the traditional high seas freedois
of navigation and overflight within the zone. Id.

accordingly to reflect that the U.S. would exercise "sovereign rights and
exclusive fishery management authority over all fish, and all Continental
Shelf fishery resources," within the EEZ. 39 Specifically excluded from both




D. Fishery Conservation Amendments Act of 1990
U.S. fishery policy regarding highly migratory species was finally
reversed with the enactment of the Fishery Conservation Amendments Act (FCAA)
of 1990. Effective January 1, 1992, the MFCMA was amended to claim
jurisdiction over tuna stocks found within the U.S. EEZ. 41 More
importantly, the FCAA for the first time recognized the right of other coastal
states to claim jurisdiction over tuna stocks found within their 200-mile EEZs
or FZs. 42 This arguably includes the right to regulate how, and to what
extent, tuna stocks will be harvested within these zones. The IDCA, however,
imposes a moratorium on the use of purse seine nets to intentionally encircle
dolphins . It therefore attempts to regulate how a foreign state may harvest
tuna within its own EEZ. Such extraterritorial regulation is clearly
3916 D.S.C. §§1801, 1811 (1992).
4 *The EEZ Proclaiation explicitly rejected U.S. jurisdiction over larine lanals and tuna and recognized
the need for international agreeients to effectively lanage these stocks. Presidential Proclaiation No. 5030,
supra note 37. The BFC8A siiilarly provided that the U.S. "shall cooperate directly or through appropriate
international organizations with those nations involved in fisheries for highly ligratory Bpecies with a viev
to ensuring conservation and proioting the objection of optiiui utilization of such species throughout their
range, both within and beyond the exclusive econoiic zone." 16 D.S.C. §1812 (1992).




inconsistent with the FCAA's recognition of a coastal state's sovereign rights
over tuna found within its EEZ
.
III. EARLY O.S. EFFORTS TO PROTECT MARINE MAMMALS
A. Marine Manmal Protection Act of 1972
Throughout much of the 1970 's and 80's, Congress was also actively
involved in extraterritorial efforts to reduce incidental marine mammal
mortality caused by domestic and foreign commercial fishermen. Concern that
certain species of marine mammals were being depleted "below their optimum
sustainable population" prompted Congress to enact the MMPA of 1972. 43 The
primary feature of the MMPA was "a moratorium on the taking and importation of
marine mammals and marine mammal products. . . . " 44 There were, of course,
exceptions to the moratorium, including an exception for the incidental taking:
of marine mammals during commercial fishing operations. 45 Under this
exception, "the incidental taking of marine mammals in the course of p.irse
seine fishing for yellowfin tuna ..." was permissible as long as commercial
fishermen were using "the best marine mammal safety techniques and
equipment. . ." that were economically and technologically practicable. 46
<M5 Fed. Reg. 72178 (1980); 16 O.S.C. §1361 (1992). "Optiiui sustainable population" is defined as "a
population size which falls within a range froi the population level of a given 6pecies or stock which is the
largest supportable within the ecosystei to the population level that results in laxiiui net productivity." 50
C.F.F. §216.3 (1991); "Baxiiui net productivity' is defined as "the greatest net annual increment in population
nuibers or bioiass resulting fron additions to the population due to reproduction and/or growth less losses due
to natural lortality." 50 C.F.R. §216.3 (1991).
<4 The i«»ediate goal of the Act was to reduce "the incidental kill or serious injury of larine lanals






Notwithstanding the enactment of the MMPA, more than 1.3 million
dolphins died in the ETP tuna fishery between 1972 and 1980 as a direct result
of intentional encirclement by purse seine nets. Dissatisfied with these and
other marine mammal mortality figures, Congress amended the MMPA in 1981 by
imposing an annual kill quota of 20,500 dolphins on the U.S. tuna fleet.
«
7
As a result, U.S. -caused dolphin mortality dropped dramatically throughout the
1980' s, reaching a record low of 1005 animals in 1991. 48 During this same




Concern over lax foreign fishing practices resulted in additional
amendments to the MMPA in 1984 and 1988. Included in these amendments was an
import ban on yellowfin tuna harvested in the ETP by nations that did not have
a dolphin conservation program comparable to that of the U.S. purse seine
fleet. Tuna imports could also be banned from such nations if their average
dolphin mortality rates exceeded U.S. standards. 50 In addition to the
possibility of a primary embargo, the MMPA amendments also prevented "tuna
laundering" by requiring intermediary nations that exported yellowfin tuna to
the U.S. "to certify and provide reasonable proof. . ." that they had taken
< 7 C. Coulston, Flipper Cauiht in the Net of Cotierce: Reauthorization of the Narine Haisal Protection ict
and Its Effect on dolphins, 11 J. BHKBGY, HAT. FKSOOBCBS 4 ENYTL. L. 97 (1990). See also 50 C.F.B.
I216.24(d)(2){i) (1991).
4«138 Cong. Bee. H9064, at 89070 (1992).
«*Jd., at B9071.
separability standards are set out in detail in 16 U.S.C. 81371(a)(2)(B) and 50 C.F.B. §216.24 (1991)
For purposes of a priiary embargo, a harvesting nation is defined as "the country under whose flag ... fishing
vessels are docuiented, or which has by fonal declaration agreed to assert jurisdiction over ... certified
charter vessels, froi which vessel(s) fish are caught that are a part of any cargo or ship«ent of fish to be
iiported into the United States ...." 50 C.F.B. §216.3 (1991).
12

measures "to prohibit the importation of such tuna. . ." from harvesting
nations subject to a primary embargo. 51 Failure to provide the required
proof would result in a secondary embargo against the noncomplying state. 52
If these embargoes failed to achieve their intended results, a further ban on
any other fish or fish product was authorized pursuant to the Fisherman's
Protective Act of 1967. 5 3 The 1988 Amendments additionally established
performance standards for tuna boat captains and required the use of dolphin-
friendly fishing technology. 54 To monitor compliance with these added
safeguards , the amendments instituted a 100 percent observer program for the
U.S. tuna fleet. 55 Similarly, foreign nations wishing to export yellowfin
tuna harvested in the ETP to the U.S. had to implement an observer program to
meet the MMPA comparability standards. 56
5U38 Cong. Pec. E2774-02 (1992); 16 O.S.C. §1371. An intermediary nation is defined as "a nation which
exports yellowfin tuna or tuna products to the Dnited States and which iiports yellowfin tuna or tuna
products." 50 C.F.R. §216.3 (1991).
52138 Cong. Fee. E2774-02 (1992); 16 O.S.C. §1371 (1992).
53The Pelly Amendment [22 O.S.C. §1978 (1988)] to the Fishenan's Protective Act authorizes the President
to ban the importation of any fish or fish product "froi a nation that diiinishes the effectiveness of an
international fishery conservation program . ..." 134 Cong. Rec. S16336, S16343 (1988).
5< Perfor«ance standards and vessel gear requirements are contained in 16 O.S.C. §1374 (1992) and 50 C.F.R.
§216. 24(d)(2) (1991). Some of the lore iiportant perforiance standards include: a ban on sundown sets; a
requireient to engage in a "backdown" procedure to release dolphins trapped in the net; and a prohibition on
the use of Class C explosives to herd dolphins into the net. Gear requireients include: porpoise safety panel
(i.e., Medina Panel); porpoise apron; porpoise safety panel markers, hand holds, and corkline hangings;
bunchlines; speedboats; rubber raft; facemasks and snorkels; and spotlights.
55138 Cong. Rec. S12946 (1988); 16 O.S.C. §1374 (1992); 50 C.F.R. §216. 24(d)(2) (1992).
56 A foreign nation had to demonstrate that its tuna fleet was being "lonitoring by observers from the
IATTC or an equivalent international program" in which the O.S. participated, and that the level of observer
coverage was equal to that imposed on O.S. vessels "unless an alternative observer program [was] ... determined
to provide sufficiently reliable documentary evidence of the nation's incidental take rate.' 54 Fed. Reg.
20171 (1989); 16 O.S.C. §1374 (1992).
13

1. Reaction to Tuna Embargoes Under the GATT
Beginning in 1990, court-ordered embargoes were imposed against various
harvesting nations that did not have comparable dolphin conservation programs
or had exceeded U.S. standards regarding average dolphin mortality rates.
Subsequently, embargoes were ordered against various intermediary nations that
failed to demonstrate that they had banned yellowfin tuna products from
nations subject to the primary embargoes. 57
In January 1991, Mexico requested the GATT Council to establish a panel
to consider whether the primary and secondary embargo provisions of the MMPA
and the labeling provisions of the DPCIA were GATT-illegal. 58 Mexican
officials argued that the embargoes violated:
(1) the prohibition on quantitative restrictions under GATT Article XI;
(2) ... the prohibitions on discriminatory administration of
quantitative restrictions under GATT Article XIII . .
.
; and (3) ... the
requirement to accord national treatment to imported goods under GATT
Article III. 59
Mexico additionally challenged the application the DPCIA labeling provisions
to Mexican tuna. 60 U.S. officials responded that, the embargo provisions
were "internal regulations permitted under GATT Article 111(4) ..." and the
^Earth Island Institute v. Hosbacber, supra note 16. Fourteen nations main subject to these eibargoes.
U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Aug. 24, 1992, Statement before the Senate Couittee on Cotierce, Science, and
transportation, Washington, D.C., Jul. 23, 1992 (statement by David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs); 58 Fed. Reg. 3013 (1993).
5*0. S. IHT'L TRADE COBB'H POB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
5SJ. Trachtian, dnited States ~ Bestrictions on Iiports of tuna, 86 AH. J. IHT'L L. 142 (Jan. 1992).
{8 Henco also challenged the potential application of a Pel ly Aiendient eibargo against other fish
products froB Mexico. Id., at 143.
14

Note Ad Article III, "and were therefore not subject to Articles XI and
XIII." 61 In the alternative, U.S. authorities argued that the embargoes
were permitted exceptions to protect animal life and conserve exhaustible
natural resources under Article XX (b) and XX (g). 62
The dispute panel found that Article III and the Note Ad Article III
were limited to the regulation of products as such (i.e., the tuna). The
MMPA, however, attempted to regulate the production process of the product
(i.e., the harvesting of tuna) and not the product itself. The panel
therefore concluded that the MMPA embargoes could not be justified as internal
regulations applied at the point of importation under Article III. With
regard to Article XX(b), the dispute panel found that the embargoes were not
necessary because the U.S. had failed to exhaust "all options consistent with
the GATT . .
.
, such as international negotiation and cooperation . .
.
, before
using GATT- inconsistent measures ,..." 63 More importantly, the panel
limited the use of Article XX (b) to domestic animal protection. The panel
61 Id., at 142-143 . Under Article 111(1) national regulations lay not be applied "to iiported or doiestic
products so as to afford protection to doiestic production." Under Article 111(4), foreign products lust be
accorded "treatment no less favorable tban that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws ... affecting their internal sale ..., distribution or use." The Note Ad Article III provides tbat "any
law ... which applies to an iiported product and the like doiestic product and is . . . enforced in the case of
the iiported product at the tiie or point of iiportation, is . . . subject to the provisions of Article III."
Article 11(1) provides that "no prohibitions ... shall be instituted ... by any ... party on the iiportation of
any product of the territory of any other ... party " General Agreeient on Tariffs and Trade (1947), 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 D.H.T.S. 187.
62 J. Trachtian, supra note 59, at 143. Article IX provides that "Subject to the requireient that such
easures are not applied in a lanner which would constitute leans of arbitrary or unjustifiable discriiination
between countries where the saie conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing
in this Agreeient shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforceient by any contracting party of
leasures ... (b) necessary to protect huian, aniial or plant life or health; ... (g) relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such leasures are lade effective in conjunction with
restrictions on doiestic production or consuiption." GATT, Article IX, supra note 61.
e
'J. Trachtian, supra note 59, at 148.
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specifically found that Article XX(b) did not "except measures from the
restriction of the GATT that are intended ... to protect foreign animals
...." 64 It similarly restricted the application of Article XX(g) by finding
that conservation measures adopted pursuant to Article XX(g) were permissible
only to the extent that they primarily restricted production or consumption
within a state's jurisdiction. 65 Having determined that the Article XX
exceptions did not apply, the panel found that the primary and secondary
embargoes were inconsistent with Article XI(l). 66 The DPCIA labelling
provisions, on the other hand, were found to be consistent with GATT Article
1(1). The panel held that the labelling provision did not restrict the sale
of tuna. Rather, tuna products could be sold with or without the "Dolphin
Safe" label. 6 7
Following the hearing, the dispute panel recommended that the GATT
Council request the U.S. to bring the MMPA and its application into compliance
with the GATT. 68 Final action on the panel report was withheld, however,
after the U.S. and Mexico reached a tentative compromise whereby Mexico agreed
not to request the GATT Council to adopt the report until after the two
nations had attempted to work out a settlement
.




65 In light of this ruling, the coiplaint was Dot reviewed under Article XIII. Id., at 143 and 147.
67 The challenge to the Pelly Aiendient was also denied on the grounds that the D.S. law allows for the
discretionary, not the landatory, iiposition of an eibargo. T. Schoenbaui, Agora: Trade and Environment:
Free International Irade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AMEF . J. IHT'L L. 700
(1992).
"Id., at 143.
630. S. INT'L TRADE COMB ' N PDB. No 2547, supra note 2.
16

reluctance to enforce the panel's report, two additional complaints have been
filed challenging the MMPA embargo provisions under the GATT. On July 14,
1992, the EC requested that a second dispute panel be established to review
the secondary import bans currently in force against Spain, France, Italy, and
the United Kingdom. 70 Venezuela has also threatened to bring a similar
action if the MMPA embargo is not lifted. 71
B. Dolphin-Safe Policy and the DPCIA
While the aforementioned court actions were ongoing, environmental
groups in the U.S. were busy organizing consumer boycotts against canned tuna
to protest dolphin-unsafe fishing practices. 72 In response to the growing
public relations problem created by these boycotts, the three principal U.S.
tuna processors- Starkist, Van Camp-Chicken of the Sea, and Bumblebee-
announced in April 1990 that they would only purchase dolphin-safe tuna for
the U.S. market. 7 3 This unexpected announcement had an immediate and
substantial effect on both the domestic and foreign tuna industries. To avoid
losing their share of the largest canned tuna market in the world, a number of
foreign tuna processors, including Mitsubishi Foods, 74 were forced to adopt
a similar policy. 75 Domestically, the U.S. purse seine fleet was forced to
7 *U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, supra note 57.
710. S INT' L TRADE COMB ' H PDB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2, at n.80.
"Id.
7356 Fed. Reg. 47418 (1991).
^Mitsubishi packages Three Diaionds brand and A&Ps ' and Safesays' store brands. A. Banning, fhe Net
Effect on dolphins, USA Today (final ed.) Aug. 6, 1990.
750. S. IHT'L TRADE COBB'N POB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
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restructure and transferred most of its fishing operations to the Western
Tropical Pacific (WTP) where the tuna-dolphin bond does not occur. 76
Whereas the U.S. fleet had once dominated the ETP tuna fishery during the
1970 's and 80 's (reaching a high of 112 vessels in 1976), by 1992, the number
of U.S. -flagged purse seiners in the ETP had dropped to seven. 77
Congress also responded to the canners ' announcement by enacting the
DPCIA of 1991. 78 The Act defines "dolphin safe" and makes it unlawful for a
tuna producer, offering to sell tuna products in the U.S. , to misuse a label
suggesting that a product is "dolphin safe". 79 Specifically, it is a
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to affix a dolphin-
safe label to any tuna product harvested:
( 1 ) Anywhere on the high seas by a vessel that uses driftnets , or ( 2 ) in
the ETP, if there is no accompanying documentation, signed by the vessel
captain, an observer, all exporters, all importers, and all processors,
certifying that no purse seine nets were intentionally deployed on
dolphins during the fishing trip on which the tuna were harvested. 80
The net effect of the dolphin-safe policy and the DPCIA is a U.S. canned tuna




"57 Fed. Reg. 27010, Table 1 (1992).
"16 B.S.C. §1385 (1992).
7916 D.S.C. 81385(d)(1) (1992).
"Id.; 56 Fed. Beg. 47418 (1991).
•156 Fed. Reg. 47418 (1991).
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IV. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT DOLPHINS IN THE ETP
A. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
The IATTC was established in 1950 by a bilateral fishing agreement
between the U.S. arid Costa Rica
.
8 2 Since its inception , the IATTC has been
concerned primarily with the conservation and management of marine resources
in the ETP. 83 Although little was accomplished during its first twenty
years of existence, since the mid- 1970' s, the IATTC has taken a leading role
in evaluating and reducing dolphin mortality in the ETP tuna fishery.
In 1976, the IATTC established the following goals to balance the
competing interests of the tuna industry and dolphin conservationists:
(1) strive to maintain a high level of tuna production [and] (2) strive
to maintain porpoise stocks at or above levels that assure their
survival in perpetuity, (3) with every reasonable effort being made to
avoid needless or careless killing of porpoise. 84
In furtherance of these goals, the IATTC implemented a voluntary observer
program in 1979 to monitor the fishing practices and performance of the
foreign fleets. 85 Dolphin mortality data collected by these observers is
used by the ETP harvesting nations to show compliance with the comparability
standards of the MMPA. 86 The data is also used to calculate annual dolphin
mortality rates for each major species and stock of dolphin. 87 Since 1988,
• 2 0ther »eiber states include: Panaia, Ecuador, Canada, Japan, France and Nicaragua. Mexico and Costa
Rica have withdrawn froi the organization. I. Holland, supra note 8.
"14.
"U.S. IHT'L TRADE COHH'N PUB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2.
8554 Fed. Reg. 20171 (1989).
"56 Fed. Reg. 47416 (1991); 53 Fed. Reg. 8910 (1988).
8754 Fed. Reg. 2017 i (1989).
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all the ETP harvesting nations with sizeable purse seine fleets have
voluntarily participated in the program. 88 Observer coverage was initially
set at 33 percent, but in January 1991, the ETP harvesting nations committed
to 100 percent coverage
.
8 9
To compliment the observer program, the IATTC issued regulations in 1987
to manage purse seine fishing in the ETP. 90 These regulations were refined
in 1991 to implement a new goal of reducing dolphin mortality to levels
approaching zero. 91 To achieve this new goal, an aggressive research
program was implemented to identify "alternative fishing methods that would
not involve the encirclement of dolphins . . . ," 92 The member states also
agreed to implement a dolphin conservation plan beginning in 1992. 93 The
combined effect of these initiatives has been an 80 percent reduction in
dolphin mortality by the foreign fleet from 133,000 animals in 1986 to 25,000
in 1991.9 4
B. IATTC Agreement of June 1992
The most significant contribution by the IATTC occurred in April 1992.
At a special meeting held in La Jolla, California, the IATTC successfully
•'These states included: Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panaia, the D.S., Vanuatu and Venezuela. Id.
"57 Fed. Reg. 47620 (1992).
•U.S. INT'L TBADE COHH'N PDB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
3157 Fed. Reg. 47620 (1992).
S3 Id.
9<J. Brooke, supra note 8; 57 Fed. Beg. 27010 (1992).
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negotiated the first ever multilateral agreement to protect dolphins in the
ETP. 95 The agreement, formally ratified in June, provides for an 80 percent
reduction in dolphin mortality between 1993 and 1999. 96 These reductions
will be implemented through a system of individual vessel quotas based on the
total number of purse seiners in the fishery and the following annual limits
on total dolphin mortality:
Year Limit Percentage of best estimate of
current populations of spotted,









Additional protections are afforded for individual species and stocks of
dolphins in Appendix III of the agreement.
A Review Panel established by the agreement will be responsible for
assigning individual vessel DMLs . The Panel will additionally review and
report annually "on the compliance of the international fleet with the
mortality limits" set out in the agreement. 98 Compliance will also be
55 J. Brooke, supra Dote 8.
n Id. The parties to the agreeient are: Coluibia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panaia, Spain,
the U.S., Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Inter-Aierican Tropical Tuna Coiiission Agreeient, Jun 92, at app. I.
87 For exaiple, if there are 100 purse seine vessels fishing in the ETP in 1993, each vessel would be
assigned a "dolphin lortality liiit" (DHL) of 195 aniials. An onboard IATTC observer Bill be responsible for
inforiing the captain when his vessel has reached its DHL. If a captain deliberately exceeds his quota, he is
subject to a fine and/or license suspension. Additionally, the vessel's quota for subsequent years would be
lowered accordingly. IATTC Agreeient, supra note 96; J. Brooke, supra note 8.
*»IATTC Agreement, supra note 96, at app. II.
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monitored by 100 percent observer coverage, 50 percent of which must be
provided by the IATTC.9 9
The agreement also establishes a full-time Scientific Advisory Board
that will be responsible for coordinating an international research
program.
I
® The research program will initially focus on improving current
purse-seine technology in order to reduce its potential of causing dolphin
mortality. 10 1 The program will also seek alternative methods of harvesting
tuna that do not involve the encirclement of dolphins. 102 Funding will be
the major obstacle for the research program, although the U.S. , Mexico,
Venezuela, and the Italian Canners Association have already pledged




V. INCREASED PROTECTION FOR DOLPHINS DNDER THE IDCA
In 1992 , Congress revived its efforts to resolve the issue of incidental
dolphin mortality in the ETP. While the Administration was negotiating the
IATTC Agreement, Congress was busy developing an alternative plan to
eliminate, vice reduce, dolphin mortality. The concept that emerged was a
tMJd. at app. IV.
i* 2 Jd. Soie proposals in this regard include: "separating tunas and dolphins prior to encircleient using
acoustic stiiuli, prey, or other stiiuli; ... using paired-trawls to capture tunas associated with dolphin
without encircleient; ... tracking and other behavioral studies of tunas and dolphins; ... locating large
yellowfin tuna with [Fish Aggregation Devices] FADs, light detecting and ranging devices (LIDAR) or other
optical sensors, and aggregating tunas with bait; [and] ... predicting the spatial distribution and
catchability of large yellowfin tuna with oceanographic data." 57 Fed. Reg. 21081 (1992).
i»357 Fed. Reg. 21081 (1992).
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moratorium on the use of purse seine nets to intentionally encircle dolphins.
The issue came to a head in July 1992 when legislation was introduced in the
Senate to implement the IATTC Agreement . 10 4 Opponents of the bill
simultaneously introduced the IDCA as an alternative solution arguing that the
IATTC Agreement was unacceptable to the American people because it allowed for
the deaths of an additional 75,000 dolphins by the year 2000.10 5 They
additionally argued that the continued use of purse seine nets was inimical to
the original MMPA goal of reducing dolphin mortality to levels approaching
zero. 106 The result was an overwhelming rejection of the IATTC Agreement
in favor of the more rigid moratorium scheme of the IDCA. 107
On October 26, 1992, the IDCA became the latest in a long line of
unilateral U.S. efforts to protect dolphins in the ETP. It differs, however,
from previous efforts in that it changes U.S. policy from one of "reducing"
incidental dolphin mortality to one of "eliminating" such mortality. To
achieve this change in policy, the Act amends the MMPA by adding a new Title
III which authorizes the Secretary of State to enter into agreements to
establish a 5-year moratorium on the use of purse seine nets (except for
research purposes) to intentionally encircle dolphins in the tuna
fisheries. 108 As an incentive for compliance, the IDCA provides that the
"<S. 2995, 102d Cong., 2d Sees. (1992).
i«5138 CoDg. Rec. B9064-02, B9067 (1992).
"•Id; 138 Cong. Rec. S10135 (1992).
Wfhe IDCA passed by a vote of 389 to 15 in the Bouse of Representatives. 138 Cong. Rec. H9365-03
(1992).
"•Pub. L. Ho. 102-523 §302 ( a ) . The required tens for any agreement entered into pursuant to §302(a) are
set out in §302(b)(l)-(5) [general teres]; §303 ( a ) [research prograi]; § 303 ( b ) [liiitfi on dolphin iortality
under research prograi] ; and §303(c) [funding for research prograi]. In addition to the loratoriue, the Act
23

U.S. will immediately lift any tuna embargo currently in effect for any nation
that agrees to observe the moratorium. 109 To take advantage of this
provision, however, a foreign state must commit in writing to: (1) implement
the moratorium by March 1, 1994; (2) allow observers onboard its purse seiners
(50% of which must be from a competent regional organization like the IATTC);
(3) reduce its 1992 level of dolphin mortality "to a level that is lower than
such mortality in 1991 by a statistically significant margin;" and (4) reduce
its January 1993 to February 1994 level of dolphin mortality "to a level that
is lower than such mortality in 1992 by a statistically significant
margin." 110 If a state agrees to abide by the moratorium but subsequently
fails to comply with its commitments under §305(a), the IDCA requires the
Secretary of the Treasury to re- impose a tuna embargo against that
nation. 111 The noncomplying state then has 60 days to certify and provide
reasonable proof that it has fully implemented its prior commitment to comply
with §305 (a). 112 If the required evidence is not provided within 60 days,




also establishes a dolphio-saf e tuna larket in the U.S. by June 1994, provides for a research progran, and
reauthorizes the South Pacific Tuna Act which iipleients "the treaty which assures access for U.S. vessels to
productive" tuna fisheries in the HTP through the year 2002. 183 Cong. Rec. B9064-02 (1992); Pub. L. Ho. 102-
523 §§ 302, 304, 307 (1992).




n3 This eibargo is liiited to fish and fish products which have "an aggregate custois valuation equal to
40 percent of the aggregate custois valuation ..." of all fish and fi6h products iiported froi that country
during the base year. Id.
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If an agreement to abide by the moratorium cannot be reached with any of
the major purse seine fishing nations by March 1, 1994, U.S. purse seiners are
permitted to continue fishing in the ETP until the end of 1999. 114
However, the total number of dolphin mortalities caused by the U.S. fleet
during this period must "continue to be reduced by statistically significant
amounts each year to levels approaching zero." 115 This provision is
significant because the embargoes under the MMPA are based, in part, on a
foreign nations failure to achieve dolphin mortality rates comparable to U.S.
standards. 116 As a result, it will become increasingly difficult for the
foreign fleet to meet these comparability standards as U.S. dolphin mortality
rates are phased down to zero by the end of 1999
.
VI. UNWARRANTED EXTENSION OF U.S. JURISDICTION
A. Reasonableness Under the Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the IDCA is
apparently based on the effects principle reflected in §402(1 )(c) of the
Restatement. 117 This principle, recognized in international law, allows a
mjd., at 6306(a)(4).
iisjd.
11816 O.S.C. §1371 (1992); 50 CJ.fi. §216.24 (1991).
1 i 7 Jurisdiction under the IDCA is derived froi the MMPA which provides that:
(5) iarine lanals and larine laual products either--
(A) love in interstate coiierce, or
(B) affect the balance of iarine ecosysteis in a Banner which is iiportant to other
aniials and aniial products which love in interstate cosierce, and that the protection and
conservation of iarine lanals is therefore necessary to insure the continuing availability of those
25

state to exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside its territory
when the effect or intended effect of such conduct within the state is
substantial. 118 However, even though a basis for jurisdiction may exist
under §402, a state is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over "a person
or activity having connections with another state . . . " if it would be
unreasonable to do so
.
x * 9 Whether an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is reasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors,
including the factors listed in §403(2) of the Restatement. 12® As will be
demonstrated below, an evaluation of those factors reflects that the IDCA is
an unreasonable extension of U.S. jurisdiction. Any interest the U.S. may
have in regulating dolphin mortality outside the U.S. EEZ is clearly
outweighed by the adverse effects such regulations will have on the
international community.
products which love in interstate coiierce; and
(6) larine lasials have proven theiselves to be resources of great international significance,
esthetics and recreational as sell as econoiic, and it is the sense of Congress that they should be
protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible conensurate with sound policies
of resource lanageient and that the priiary objective of their «anageient should be to laintain the
health and stability of the >arine ecosystei. ...
16 D.S.C. §1361 (1992).





1 . Link Between Purse Seine Fishing and the . S .
i
2 i
Reasonableness under the Restatement initially turns on the extent to
which the activity to be regulated occurs "within" , or has a direct and
substantial effect "upon", the regulating state. 122 Since the great
majority of purse seine fishing occurs "outside" the U.S. EEZ, the
extraterritorial application of the IDCA will only be reasonable under
§403(2) (a) if purse seining has a direct and substantial effect "upon" the
U.S. There are arguably two bases under which the U.S. can claim that purse
seine fishing has an effect "upon" the U.S. Neither of these bases, however,
satisfy the "substantial and direct effect" requirement of §402 or §403 of the
Restatement.
As the largest canned tuna market in the world, the U.S. may argue that
it has a substantial interest in maintaining a dolphin-safe tuna market for
American consumers. 123 The IDCA is necessary to achieve this goal because
more than one-third of all canned tuna consumed in the U.S. is imported. 1 24
The trouble with this argument is that this interest can be achieved without
implementing the IDCA. Dolphin-unsafe tuna is already effectively precluded
from sale in the U.S. by the dolphin-safe policy and the DFCIA labelling:
12 iTbe first factor to consider is "the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place nithin the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory." Id., at §403 ( 2 ) f a )
.
mid.
1230. S. INT' L TRADE COHH'N PUB. 2547, supra note 2.
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provisions. ! 25 Therefore, the IDCA is unnecessary and cannot be justified
on this basis.
Secondly, Congress has indicated that "marine mammals play an important
role in the marine ecosystem and that they are significant recreational and
esthetics resources ..." for the U.S. i 26 Since dolphins are highly
migratory species that move freely between the various EEZs encompassed by the
ETP, this interest could be affected if substantial depletions of dolphin
stocks occur outside the U.S. EEZ. Therefore, the U.S. arg.iably has an
interest in maintaining an "optimum sustainable population" of dolphins in the
ETP'. 127 The difficulty with this argument, however, is that current
scientific evidence does not support, the conclusion that dolphin stocks or
species are currently endangered or threatened in the ETP. C>n the contrary,
scientific studies indicate that dolphin stocks and species in the ETP' are
healthy and can sustain the current level of incidental mortality in
perpetuity
.
128 These scientific findings become even more significant when
the reductions in dolphin mortality required by IATTC Agreement are taken into
consideration. Hence, the IDCA cannot be supported on this basis.
It appears therefore that the continued use of purse seine nets
proscribed by the IDCA does not have a "substantial and direct" effect "upon"
the U.S. Consequently, it would be unreasonable to extend the IDCA
extraterritorial ly based on this factor alone. Moreover, since the U.S.
i2 55ee note 81.
12M34 Cong. Rec. S16336, S16342 (1988). See also 16 O.S.C. §1361(6) (1992).
1J7 See note 43 for a definition of "optiiui sustainable population".
i 28Q. s. IHT'L TRADE COHH'N PDB. No. 2547, supra note 2; 55 Fed. Reg. 11921 119901. These studies sill be
discussed in lore detail in the §403(2)(c) analysis.
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cannot demonstrate that purse seine fishing will have a "substantial effect"
within its territory, the U.S. fails to satisfy the basic requirement for
jurisdiction under the effects doctrine. As a result, any extraterritorial
extension of the IDCA would not only be unreasonable, but would also have no
basis under customary international law. However, even if the IDCA can
overcome this initial obstacle, an evaluation of the remaining seven factors
clearly demonstrates the unreasonableness of extending the law beyond the U.S.
EEZ.
2. The Connection Between the Purse
Seine Fleet and the O.S.12S
Although once dominant in the ETP, the size of the U.S. purse seine
fleet has declined significantly since the enactment of the 1981 amendments to
the MMPA.130 The dolphin-safe policy and the DPCIA have likewise had an
impact on further reducing U.S. participation in the ETF tuna fishery. *3i
Under the IDCA, even if the proposed moratorium does not take effect, the
remaining seven U.S. purse seiners will be forced out of the ETP by
1999.132
Foreign presence, on the other hand, has grown appreciably since the
1980' s. Whereas in 1971, there were only 13 foreign-flagged purse seiners
125 The second factor to consider is "the connections, such as nationality, residence, or econoiic
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,
or between that state and those whoi the regulation is designed to protect." RESTATEMENT ( THISD ) , supra note
118, at §403(2) (b)
.
"•57 Fed. Reg. 47620 (1992).
13157 Fed. Reg. 27010, Table 1 (1992).
i32Pub. L. No. 102-523, §306(a)(4) (1992).
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operating in the ETP, by 1990 there were 90. 133 Over 80 percent of these
vessels fly the Mexican or Venezuelan flag. 134
Based on the level of participation alone, it is obvious that the
foreign nations that maintain a significant presence in the ETP, not the U.S.
,
have a greater interest in regulating fishing activities in the tuna fishery
.
The continued assertion of U.S. jurisdiction over foreign fishing practices in
the ETP, despite a conscious decision by the U.S. to abandon the region, is
clearly unreasonable and seriously impinges on the sovereignty of the ETP
harvesting nations to regulate their respective tuna fleets
.
3. Importance and Acceptability of the IDCA 135
The next question that must be addressed under the Restatement 's test is
whether the international community will accept the level of importance that
the U.S. has placed on the elimination of dolphin mortality in the ETP.
Since 1972, one of the primary goals of the MMPA has been to reduce
dolphin mortality in the purse seine fisheries to levels approaching zero in
order to maintain the overall viability of the dolphin populations. 136 The
proponents of the IDCA argue that this goal cannot be achieved unless a
1335? Fed. Reg. 27010, Table 1 (1992).
^Countries currently fishing in the ETP include: Ecuador, Costa Rica , France, Japan, Sicaragua , Mexico,
Panaia, Spain, the D.S. Venezuela, and Vanuatu. Only the U.S., Panaiia, Mexico and Venezuela continue to use
purse seine nets to intentionally encircle dolphins. Mexico maintains over 50 purse seine boats; Venezuela
aintains over 25. U.S. IHT'L TRADE COMMA PUB. Do. 2547, supra note 2, at n.90; 54 Fed. Reg. 20171, Table 1
(1989).
1} 5The third factor to consider is "the character of the activity to be regulated, the iiportance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 118, at
§403(2)(c).
13616 U.S.C. §1371 (a) (1992).
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moratorium on the use of purse seine nets to intentionally encircle dolphins
is implemented. 137 They additionally argue that the continued killing of
dolphins in the ETP is unacceptable to the American people .
*
3 8 Thus , in
the opinion of Congress, the IDCA is necessary to ensure the viability of
dolphin stocks in the ETP and to allay the concerns of the American people
that dolphins are being slaughtered in the ETP. 139 However, based on
available scientific evidence and National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS)/IATTC
observer data, the importance placed on the elimination of dolphin mortality
by the U.S. is simply untenable. Moreover, it completely ignores the social
and economic impact the elimination of purse seine fishing will have on lesser
developed countries like Mexico and Venezuela. It is not surprising, then,
that the U.S. position is not supported by most of the ETP harvesting nations.
Although there is growing international support for enhanced dolphin
protection, much of the international community disagrees with the mariner in
which the U.S. has attempted to impose its dolphin conservation standards on
the rest of the world. 140 Mexico and Venezuela, in particular, have
13M38 Cong. Rec. S10135 (1992); 138 Cong. Rec. H9064-02, B9067 (1992).
i3»Pub. L. Ho. 102-523, 0301(b) ( 1 ) (1992); 138 Cong. Rec. B9064-02, H9067 (1992).
138 #ote that tbe proponents of the IDCA additionally argued that, even if dolphin stocks are not
endangered, the intentional encircleient of dolphins with purse seine nets should still be prohibited because
such activities place the aniials under stress. This arguient was justified on the ground that dolphins are
entitled to special protection because "huian beings have always felt a special sense of kinship and Bonder
toward the dolphin, because of its beauty, its grace, and its proven intelligence." While laudable, there is




'In support of the D.S. position, the French Tuna Canners Association and two Italian tuna processors
have indicated that they will not buy dolphin-unsafe tuna fro« the ETP. K. Conner, supra note 6.
Additionally, the Fisheries Conittee of the European Parliaient passed a resolution in Septeiber 1991
reconiending a ban on the isportation of dolphin-unsafe tuna to the 12 leiber EC. E. Epstein, Conservationists
Bash Salinas' Dolphin Plan, The San Francisco Chronicle, Sep. 27, 1991, at A14 (final ed.). Note, however,
that the EC has filed a GATT complaint to challenge the secondary eibargo provisions of the HHPA.
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expressed their strong opposition to the IDCA. Government officials in both
nations have publicly denounced the IDCA as an unilateral measure that
impinges on their sovereignty and could have devastating effects on their
economy and tuna industry. 141 Columbia and Vanuatu have also indicated
that they will not support the IDCA for many of the same reasons. 14 2 In
light of these statements and the recently concluded IATTC Agreement, it would
appear that the ETP harvesting nations believe that the best way to guarantee
the long-term sustainability of dolphin stocks is "not by the imposition of
unilateral measures or embargoes ..." by the U.S. , but rather through
multilateral efforts at the IATTC. 1 43
Opposition to the IDCA is not only based on sovereignty and
economic/social concerns, but also on a number of scientific studies which
found that a moratorium on purse seine fishing in the ETP would be
unwise. 144 These studies suggest that dolphin mortality can be reduced "to
acceptable levels through a careful conservation program and the gradual
development of new [fishing] methods ...," 145 They further recommend that
the best way to protect dolphins in the ETP is through better training of tuna
Additionally, the iajority of states subject to HHPA eibargoes have not taken the necessary steps to have the
iiport bans lifted.
^Venezuela: Offensive on All Fronts Against U.S. funa Eibargo, Inter Press Service, Jan. 29, 1992;
Hexico funa Fishing Policy Defined, Los Angeles Tiles, Nov. 22, 1992, at D5, col. 4 (hoie ed.).
H*138 Cong. Rec. B9064-02, B9068 (1992). The fact that Vanuatu has not endorsed the IDCA is significant
since it is the only nation subject to a priiary HHPA eibargo that has taken the steps necessary to have the
iiport ban lifted.
^Hexico tuna Fishing Policy defined, supra note 141.
mThese studies sere conducted by the National Acadeiy of Sciences, the National Research Council, and
the IATTC. Id.; 138 Cong. Pec. H9064-02, H9068 (1992).
"^Mexico funa Fishing Policy Defined, supra note 141.
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boat captains and crews on dolphin-friendly fishing techniques. 146
Moreover, a four-year study released by the National Research Council in
February 1992 indicated that "no practical alternative" to purse seine fishing
exists to protect dolphins in the ETP. 147 This study additionally found
that purse seine fishing was "the only commercially viable way of harvesting
..." large yellowfin tuna in the ETP.1 48 The Council's report further
supported the ETP harvesting nations' position that international cooperation
is necessary if dolphin conservation efforts are to succeed and specifically
recommended that the U.S. bring its "goals in line with the objectives of
other nations, i.e., a reduction strategy as opposed to an elimination
strategy. "1 49
It appears therefore that the importance of eliminating dolphin
mortality in the ETP is not shared by most of the ETP harvesting nations. Nor
is the U.S. position supported by the overwhelming weight of scientific
evidence which suggests that an absolute ban on purse seine fishing is
unnecessary to protect dolphins in the tuna fisheries. Father, this evidence
suggests that the best way to protect dolphins in the ETP is through
multilateral efforts. The unilateral extension of U.S. jurisdiction is
therefore clearly unnecessary and unreasonable.
i««U.S. IRT'L TRADE COMH'M PDB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
H7 B. Parrish, Study Says Ban on Nets Can't Save Dolphins, Los Angeles Tiies, Feb. 28, 1992, at Al, col. 3
(Southland ed. ).
n*Jd. ; O.S. IHT'L TRADE COHM'K PDB. No. 2547, supra note 2. Siiilar recowendations have been lade by
the NHFS and IATTC. 57 Fed. Reg. 21081 (1992); IATTC Agree»ent, supra note 96.
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4. Justified Expectations Protected or Hurt by the IDCA150
The IDCA restates preexisting expectations under the DPCIA and MMPA of
achieving a dolphin-safe tuna market in the U.S and maintaining an optimum
sustainable dolphin population in the ETP. 151 The legislative history also
makes clear that the proponents of the IDCA expect that the new law will
provide a solution to the current tuna ban disputes before the GATT. 152
The first two expectations have already been achieved under preexisting
legislation. The latter cannot be achieved by imposing a moratorium on the
use of purse seine nets . Consequently , further extraterritorial regulation in
the ETP by the U.S. is unnecessary.
The distinct preference for dolphin-safe tuna by American consumers can
be guaranteed by continued application of the dolphin-safe policy and DPCIA
labelling requirements. Further unilateral regulations which force the U.S.
standard on foreign consumers goes well beyond the expectation of achieving a
dolphin-safe tuna market in the U.S. and is clearly unreasonable.
Similarly, the IDCA is not necessary to ensure the viability of dolphin
stocks in the ETP. Based on the current number of dolphins in the ETP,
scientists have concluded that the current, levels of incidental mortality
caused by the use of purse seine nets are sustainable by the ETP dolphin
15 *The fourth factor to consider is "the existence of justified expectations that light be protected or
hurt by the regulation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), suprs note 118, at §403(2)(d).
isiPub. L. Ho. 102-523, §301 (1992).
152138 Cong. Fee. H9064-02, H9071 (1992).
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populations. J 53 IATTC data collected in 1991 showed that incidental
dolphin mortalities in the ETP were as follows
:
Stock Population Incidental Percent
abundance mortality mortality
Northeastern spotted 738 , 100
Western and/or 1 , 299 , 300
southern spotted
All spotted (except 2,037,400 13,991 .69
coastal
)
Eastern spinner 632 , 700 5 , 879 .93
Whitebelly spinner 1,020,100 2,974 .29
Northern common 477,000 161 .03
Central common 415,600 3,182 .77
Southern common 2,211,500 115 .01
Other dolphins 2,729,100 990 .04
All 9,523,400 27,292 .29154
These numbers are significant because scientific analysis has shown that
incidental mortality rates below two percent do not jeopardize the recovery of
the stocks. 155 It is evident from this data that dolphin populations in
the ETP are not endangered by current purse seine fishing practices . l 5 6
153 The National Acadeiy of Sciences estiiates the nuiber of dolphins to be at 8 lillion. The IATTC puts
the nuiber at over 9.5 Billion. 138 Cong. Rec. 89064-02, H9068 (1992); IATTC Agreeient, supra note 96, at app.
Ill; D.S. INT'L TRADE COHM'H POB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2.
15 4 IATTC Agreeient, supra note 96, at app. III.
155/d.
156 It should be noted that the NBFS deteriined in 1992 that the eastern spinner dolphin and northern
offshore spotted dolphin sere "depleted" as that tened is defined in 16 D.S.C. §1362. 57 Fed. Reg. 27010
(1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 27207 (1992). Bosever, neither stock sas designated as a "threatened" species under the
Endangered Species Act [16 D.S.C. §1532(2)]. 57 Fed. Reg. 47620 (1992). Moreover, scientific studies indicate
that the population size of both stocks has been progressively increasing or has reiained stable for the past
15 years. Id. Based on this evidence, the NBFS has concluded that "given the present abundance estiiates and
levels of take, that the population will renain viable in perpetuity." Id.
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Additionally, since incidental dolphin mortalities wil] decline under the
IATTC Agreement, dolphin stocks in the ETP will increase. This will further
ensure the population's viability in perpetuity. 157
Application of the moratorium could, on the other hand, increase dolphin
mortality in the short-term. It could also affect the sustainability of tuna
stocks worldwide. ! 58 Without question, the U.S. tuna fleet has the best
fishing practices and the lowest dolphin mortality rate of any fleet currently
operating in the ETP. The IDCA will, however, essentially force the remaining
seven U.S. purse seiners out of business. As U.S. vessels withdraw from the
fishery, foreign-flagged vessels, with higher dolphin mortality rates, will
take their place. The result will be the incidental death of more dolphins
over the short term until the IATTC Agreement takes full effect in 1999.159
Therefore, rather than eliminating dolphin mortality, the IDCA will have the
opposite effect of frustrating the MMPA's goal of reducing dolphin mortality
in the ETP.
Of equal concern is the increasing number of tuna boats that are
harvesting younger yellowfin tuna to avoid killing dolphins. 16^ Because
younger tuna rarely associate with dolphins, they may be harvested without
intentionally setting nets on dolphins. 161 The problem is that the younger
15757 Fed. Reg. 47620 (1992)
i^Study: Ho Practical Hay to Ensure "dolphin Safe" Tuna Fishini, Journal of Coiierce, Bar. 2, 1992, at
A5, col. 5.
1 5 9The saie arguient has been lade sith regards to the DPCIA and dolphin-safe policy. S. Hydans, drive to
Save dolphins Jolts Aierican funa Fleet, The Hew York Tiies, Bay 10, 1990, at Al, col. 2 (late ed. - final); I
Tuna Canners Shun Fishini That Snares dolphins, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 11, 1990, at CI (North Sports final).
i 6e J. Brooke, supra note 8.
161 S. Bydans, supra note 159.
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tuna are essential for replenishment of the stocks. If the immature tunas are
over-fished, yellowfin tuna stocks in the ETP could be cut in half by the year
2000. 162 Similarly, tuna stocks in the WTP, where the tuna-dolphin bond
does not occur, could also be threatened by over-fishing as ETP tuna boats are
forced to migrate to the western Pacific to remain in business.
i
g 3 Since
1990, the number of U.S. tuna boats alone has increased in the WTP from 35 to
50. 164 This increased U.S. presence in the WTP is directly attributable to
dolphin conservation legislation like the MMPA, DPCIA and IDCA, which make it
financially unattractive for U.S. vessels to remain in the ETP. Thus, the
IDCA could have the opposite effect of increasing dolphin mortality, as well
as potentially endangering the sustainability of tuna stocks.
The IDCA will likewise fail to achieve U.S. expectations to resolve the
current tuna ban disputes before the GATT. The IDCA can only resolve these
disputes by lifting the MMPA embargoes. However, before the import bans can
be lifted, the embargoed nations must agree to abide by the moratorium
.
165
Yet both nations that have filed GATT complaints against the U.S. have
indicated that they are unable and unwilling to abide by the moratorium. As a
result, the MMPA embargoes and the GATT disputes will persist. i 6 6
It is clear, therefore, that the IDCA is unnecessary or will fail to
achieve its desired results. Moreover, it completely ignores the needs and
i * 2 j . Brooke, suprd note 8.
153138 Cong. Dec. E2783-01 (1992).
mQ.S. INT'L TEADE COBM'N PDB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2.
16 5138 Cong. Rec. H9064-02, B9071 (1992).
1{6 0.S. obligations under the GATT sill be addressed further in the §403 ( 2 ) ( e ) discussion.
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expectations of the foreign tuna fleets to continue fishing in the ETP. Since
the 1980' s, both the U.S. and foreign tuna fleets have adopted new fishing
techniques and equipment, at great expense, to substantially reduce dolphin
mortality in the ETP. 167 Dolphin kills have been reduced from over 700,000
in 1960 to 27,000 in 1991.168 Under the IATTC Agreement, incidental
dolphin mortalities will be further reduced to less than 5,000 per year by
1999. 169 These accomplishments were not achieved by unilateral U.S.
efforts, but rather by the combined efforts and cooperation of the U.S. and
foreign tuna fleets. The IDCA's reward for this outstanding record of
achievement and cooperation is to put the purse seine fleets out of business
.
Such a result is neither just nor reasonable.
5. Importance of IDCA to the International
Political, Legal, or Economic System 170
Imposition of a moratorium in the ETP could also have a number of
adverse economic, legal and political consequences for both the U.S. and the
international community. For example, a moratorium on the use of purse seine
nets could cause significant social and economic disruption for states like
Mexico and Venezuela that rely heavily on the ETP as a food source and for
jobs. Continued embargoes under the MMPA could derail U.S. and international
efforts to renew the stalled GATT talks. Similarly, support in Congress for
157 D.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, supra Dote 57.
i"D.S. IRT'L T1ADE COMB'S POB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2.
1{9 See Dote 134.
17 *The next factor to consider is "the iiportance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or econoiic systei." RESTATKHENT (THIRD), supra note 118, at §403{2)(c).
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the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may not be forthcoming unless
Mexico agrees to implement the IDCA moratorium. Finally, the unprecedented
progress made by the IATTC to reduce dolphin mortality at the multilateral
level could be impeded if U.S. unilateralism continues in the ETF. In short,
what appears to be an isolated problem to the supporters of the HXDA, is, in
fact, an issue that could potentially affect a broad range of international
interests far removed from the ETP and far more important than the death of
75,000 dolphins over the next six years.
Economically, continued unilateral dolphin conservation efforts by the
U.S. could have a devastating effect on the economies a several Latin American
countries . The current embargoes under the MMPA have already had an adverse
economic impact on several states, including Mexico and Venezuela. 171
Venezuela has suffered the most due to its historic reliance on the U.S. to
purchase over 50 percent of its ETP yellowfin tuna catch. 172 This harvest
has an estimated annual value of about $14 million. 173 Mexico has also
been affected, but not as severely. Having a strong European market, it is
less dependent on the U.S. to purchase its ETF' tuna harvest. 174 Before the
tuna embargo was imposed, Mexico was exporting about $10 million worth of
yellowfin tuna to the U.S. annually. 175 However, if those nations subject
171 0ther nations affected by the MMPA eibargoes include: Ecuador, Cayian Islands, Panasa, Spain and
Vanuatu. Prior to the eibargoes these nations sere exporting over 60 percent of their co«bined ETP tuna
harvest to the U.S. Ecuador alone was exporting over 25 percent of its total ETP yelloufin tuna catch to the
U.S. 53 Fed. Reg. 8910 (1988).
"»53 Fed. Beg. 8910 (1988).
I'sg.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, supra note 5T.
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to secondary embargoes decide to comply with the MMPA and ban Mexican tuna,
Mexico could lose an additional $57 million in tuna exports per year. 17(5
In addition to the possibility of continued embargoes under the MMT'A,
the added import ban provisions of the IDCA could have a more devastating
effect, on the economies of the ETP harvesting nations. As previously
discussed, if a nation fails to comply with its agreement to implement the
moratorium, the IDCA provides for the imposition of additional sanctions
including "a ban on the importation of all tuna products, a ban on at least 40
percent of all ... fish products and ... a total ban on fish products." 177
A total ban on all fish products is of particular concern to Mexico. Fishing
is one of Mexico's top industries. It currently employs over 269,000 people
and has developed into one of Mexico's top five foreign exchange
earners. 17 « In 1992, an estimated $520 million in fish products were
exported. 179 The majority of these products, with the exception of tuna,
were exported to the U.S. 180 If an all-fish product embargo were imposed




176 Venezuela would also be affected by such a decision since it is currently exporting about 50 percent of
its ETP tuna harvest to Europe. Id.
i"Pub. L. No. 102-523, §305(b)(2) (1992); 138 Cong. Fee. H9064-02, 19071 (1992); 138 Cong. Rec . S17840-
05, S1784! (1992).
lli Eexico takes a Lead in Fish Exports: Fishini Belps Exports, Nutrition I Jobs Creation, Latin Aierican
Hessletters, Ltd. (1988), Latin Aierican Conodities Report, Jun. 2, 1988, at 4.
17 9 Pobberson , In Mexico, i feipest Over Tuna, The Washington Post, Jan. 8, 1993, at A12, col. 1.
n'Latin Aierican Newsletters, Ltd. (1988), Latin Aierican Conodities Report, Jul. 15, 1988, at 15.
1




The threat of embargo is not, however, the only economic concern Mexico
and Venezuela have with the IDCA. There are other economic and social reasons
that make compliance with the moratorium impossible for both nations. Mexico
and Venezuela operate the two largest p.irse-seine fishing fleets in the
ETP. 182 Implementation of a moratorium would effectively put these fleets
out of business. The result would be heavy job losses and a severe reduction




Proponents of the IDCA suggest that Mexico .and Venezuela can avoid these
job and food source losses by transferring their purse seine fishing
operations to the WTP where the tuna-dolphin bond is not a problem. 184
This suggestion presumes, however, that boat, captains can afford to make the
extensive and costly modifications necessary to fish in the WTP. 185 Such a
transfer normally requires a vessel to refit "with a new mile-long net, a
larger hydraulic system and power block assembly, and new sonars to detect the
tuna." 186 In addition to these refitting costs, significantly greater
expenses for fuel , repairs and transshipment fees are experience by vessels
operating in the WTP. 187 Moreover, even if a vessel can afford to refit,
18254 Fed. Reg. 20171, Table 1 (1989)
1<3 Arguably, the embargoes under the MMPA are the lesser of the two evils. Mexico Backs Away Fros Fact
on tuna, Los Angeles Tiies, Nov. 4, 1992.
i»«138 Cong. Fee. B9064-02, H9069 (1992).
1850. S. IHT'L TRADE COHB'N PDB. No. 2547, supra note 2. In Mexico, very high interest rates 1180* in
1991) have restricted the ability of lost fisherien to obtain loans to pay for these lodifications. tiexico -
Fishing Equipment/Supplies, National Trade Data Bank (1991), Market Reports, Jun. 11, 1991.
186 S. Mydans, supra note 159.
l»U.S. IHT'L TRADE COHB'N PDB. No. 2547, supra note 2.
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it will not have guaranteed access to most of the abundant WTP tuna fisheries.
Because the WTP is already overcrowded, many of the rich tuna fisheries are
managed by the member nations of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
pursuant to the South Pacific Tuna Treaty of 1987.188
A second alternative proposed for those vessels that cannot afford to
refit is to fish on skipjack or immature yellowfin tuna in the ETP. This
alternative, however, is also not a viable solution. First, because these
tunas are smaller, they are more expensive to process. 189 Abroad, these
added expenses place Latin American fishermen at a competitive disadvantage in
the international tuna market. At home, these costs are ultimately passed on
to domestic consumers in the form of higher prices. Secondly, as previously
discussed, harvesting immature tuna could adverse affect the ability of the
stocks to replenish themselves. 190 Based on the foregoing, compliance with
the IDCA is simply not a viable economic option for states like Mexico arid
Venezuela operating large purse seine fleets in the ETP.
Extraterritorial application of U.S. dolphin conservation laws has also
contributed to the difficult position in which the U.S. finds itself before
the GATT. At a time when the international community appears ready to renew
the stalled talks, the U.S. finds itself in the awkward position of having
been found in violation of its GATT obligations. Although Mexico has decided
not to submit the dispute panel ruling to the GATT Council for enforcement,
continued adherence to that position is contingent on a successful resolution




of the dispute with the U.S. 191 Additionally, the EC and Venezuela have
indicated that they are prepared to go forward with their own complaints
against, the MMPA import bans if the U.S. does not cancel the embargoes or if
Mexico fails to have the GATT panel's ruling adopted. 192 If these
complaints go forward, it is almost certain that the GATT panel will rule
against the U.S. 193 Such a result would place the U.S. in an even more
difficult position before the GATT. 194 A resolution to this controversy
must, therefore, be achieved if the U.S. is to improve its negotiating
position at any subsequent talks.
The solution proposed by Congress is a lifting of the current tuna
embargoes pursuant to §305 of the IDCA. Although it is true that a
cancellation of the embargoes would resolve the GATT issue, the import bans
can only be lifted under §305 if a foreign state agrees to observe the
moratorium. However, "both Mexico and Venezuela have indicated their
opposition to a ban on the use of purse seine nets. Accordingly , the
embargoes will not be lifted under the II€A and the disputes will continue.
isiO. S. IHT'L TRADE COHK'K POB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2. It has also been suggested that Mexico failed to
have the GATT panel decision enforced so as not to jeopardize its chances of winning Congressional approval of
the NAFTA. L. Staiier, White Bouse dries End to Ban on Sexican Tuna, Los Angeles Ti«es, Bar. 5, 1992, at A3,
col. 1 (hoie ed. ).
192 /d. ; D.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, supra note 57. Twelve other GATT leiber states have joined in the
love to have the GATT Council adopt the D.S. -Mexico dispute panel ruling. These ie«bers include: Argentina,
Canada, India, Peru, Japan, Colu»bia, Senegal, South Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Brazil and Eong Kong. D.
Ross, Mini GMT Dolphin-Safe: Trade and the Enviroment, 2 DOKE J. COUP. 4 IHT'L L. 345 (1992), at n.93. In
addition, a nuiber of states submitted third-party stateients in support of the Mexican position during the
hearings of the D.S. -Mexico dispute, including: Senegal, the Philippines, Thailand, Horway, Australia,
Venezuela, Canada, the EC, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. Id., at n.104.
193 O.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, supra note 57.
154 It has also been reported that the tuna-dolphin issue could coiplicate the acceptance of the NAFTA in
both Mexico and the D.S. L. Stanier, supra note 191. A satisfactory solution to the tuna-dolphin issue is,
therefore, iiportant in both a domestic and an international context.
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Moreover, the IDCA provides that, if no major purse seine fishing nation
(i.e., Mexico and Venezuela) agrees to the moratorium, U.S. purse seiners can
continue to operate in the ETP as long as the total dolphin mortality rates
each year are "reduced by statistically significant amounts . .
.
."195 Under
this provision, U.S. tuna boats will continue purse seining in the ETP until
1999 under a more ambiguous "comparability standard" than the one denounced by
the U.S. -Mexico dispute panel. 196 In addition, the IDCA ignores the
dispute panel's finding that U.S. jurisdiction to restrict products brought
into the U.S. can not be applied extraterritorial ly to regulate production
processes abroad. 197 It likewise ignores the panel's findings that the
Article XX(b') and (g) exceptions can only be applied to protect domestic
animals and resources within a state's jurisdiction. The IDCA is simply
another attempt by the U.S. to use the environmental exceptions of the GATT to
protect dolphins beyond the U.S. EEZ. Such an attempt will not survive a
subsequent GATT challenge. The only sure solution to the tuna ban dispute is
for the U.S. to immediately lift the MMPA embargoes and amend the IDCA to
bring it into compliance with IATTC Agreement.
With regard to the international legal system, the U.S. has
traditionally held itself out as a nation that observes the rule of law. One
of the basic principles of international law is that nations have a duty to
I35pu b. L. Ho. 102-523, 306(a)(4) (1992)
156 0nder the HHPA, the laxnui incidental dolphin tortality rate that a foreign nation lust leet during
any given period in order to export tuna to the U.S. is linked to actual U.S. >ortality figures for the saie
period. The U.S. -Mexico dispute panel found this requireient to be too unpredictable, and hence inconsistent
with GATT, Article 11(b) and (g), because the Mexicans would have no way of knowing whether they were in
coipliance with U.S. standards at any given point in tiie. T. Schoenbaui, supra note 67.
187 J. Trachtian, supra note 59, at 150.
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observe their treaty obligations. 198 The IDCA, however, violates this
universally accepted tenet of customary international law. As enacted, the
IDCA will violate preexisting U.S. treaty commitments under: (1) the 1958
Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas; (2) the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas; (3) the GATT; and
(4) the IATTC Agreement . i 9
9
Under Article 1(1) of the Fishery Convention, all states enjoy a high
seas freedom of fishing subject to three limitations: (1) their treaty
obligations; (2) the rights of coastal states provided in Articles 6 and 7;
and (3) the provisions of the convention dealing with conservation of
resources. 200 With regard to coastal state rights and the conservation of
living resources of the high seas, Article 4(1) of the Fishery Convention
imposes a duty to negotiate multilateral conservation agreements on all states
"engaged in fishing the same . . . stocks of fish or other living marine
resources in any area ... of the high seas . ..." Under Article 6(1), however,
coastal states are given a preferential status over other states with regard
to "the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of
i 9 8 This principle is set out in the Vienna Convention on the Lao of Treaties, D.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/2?,
(1969), 63 AMER. J. INT L L. 875 (1969). Article 26 provides: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and lust be perforied by thei in good faith."
159Thirty-eight states are parties to the Fishery Convention, including Mexico, Venezuela and the O.S.
Sixty-two states are parties to the High Seas Convention, including Mexico, Venezuela and the D.S. HHP-9
,
supra note 33. D.S. violations of the GATT have been previously discussed and vill not be discussed in this
section. See note 19 for a list of parties to the IATTC Agree»ent which include Mexico, Venezuela and the D.S.
^••Article 2 of the High Seas Convention contains a siiilar high seas freedoi of fishing. The only
liiitation on this freedoi is that it lust be exercised with "reasonable regard to the interests of other
States " Article 2 additionally prohibits any state froi exercising sovereignty over any part of the high
seas. Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention give the flag state jurisdiction over vessels that fly its flag.
This iiplies that the flag state has jurisdiction to regulate fishing practices by its vessels on the high
seas. The IDCA, to the extent that it atteipts to regulate the fishing practices of the foreign tuna fleets,
interferes with this high seas freedoi and is therefore inconsistent with D.S. treaty obligations.
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the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea." Any other state engaged in
fishing in this area is required by Article 6(3) to "enter into negotiations
with a view to prescribing by agreement the measures necessary for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area." If an
agreement has not been reached within six months, the coastal state may enact
unilateral conservation measures consistent with Article 7(1) and 7(2). 201
Additionally, once the coastal state has enacted conservation measures for the
area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, Article 7 provides that
other states are prohibited from enforcing their own conservation measures in
that area if those regulations are inconsistent with "those which have been
adopted by the coastal State . . . . " Most states with coastlines bordering the
ETP have enacted domestic legislation to regulate and improve the fishing
practices of their purse seine fleets . 20 2 The IDCA moratorium is
inconsistent with many of these regulations and is therefore in direct
violation of Articles 6 and 7 of the Fishing Convention.
With regard to U.S. treaty obligations in the tuna fishery, 20 year ago.
Congress charged the Secretary of State to negotiate a multilateral agreement
with the ETP harvesting nations to protect dolphins taken incidentally in the
2,1 To be consistent with Article 7(2), the unilateral leasures adopted iuet fulfill the following
requirements:
(a) That there is a need for urgent application of conservation measures in the light of
the existing knowledge of the fishery;
(b) That the leasures adopted are based on appropriate scientific findings;
(c) That such eeasures do not discriiinate in fori or in fact against foreign fisherien.
2' 2 These states include Ecuador, Mexico, Panaia, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Prance, Guateiala and the
Netherlands Antilles. 55 Fed. Beg. 11921 (1990); I. Holland, supra note 6, at n.68.
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course of purse seine fishing operations. 203 That agreement was to provide
for:
(i) cooperative research into alternative methods of locating and
catching yellowfin tuna which do not involve the taking of marine
mammals, (ii) cooperative research on the status of affected marine
mammal population stocks, (iii) reliable monitoring of the number, rate,
and species of marine mammals taken by vessels of harvesting nations,
(iv) limitations on incidental take levels based upon the best
scientific information available, and (v) the use of the test marine
mammal safety techniques and equipment that are economically and
technologically practicable to reduce the incidental kill and serious
injury of marine mammals to insignificant levels approaching a zero
mortality and serious injury rate . . . . 204
All that and more was achieved in June 1992 when the ETP harvesting nations
agreed to sign the IATTC Agreement. Without question, this agreement is the
most significant accomplishment regarding dolphin conservation that has
occurred at the international level in the last 50 years. 205 Four months
later, however, this noteworthy achievement was placed in jeopardy with the
passage of the IDCA. By enacting the IDCA, Congress ignored 20 years of
negotiations that produced a solid conservation program that all the ETP
harvesting nations, except the U.S., can accept. Moreover, to the extent that
the IDCA moratorium interferes with a state's fishing rights by prohibiting
incidental takes, it is inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the IATTC
Agreement. Such action on the part of the U.S. is clearly unreasonable and
provides little incentive for the ETP harvesting nations to engage in further
discussions with the U.S. over the tuna-dolphin issue.
2*316 D.S.C. 1378(a)(2) (1992).
** 5 0.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, supra note 57.
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From the foregoing, it is evident that implementation of the IDCA will
have a number of adverse international economic, legal and political
consequences. To the extent that these effects can be reduced or eliminated
by adherence to the IATTC Agreement, the U.S. acts unreasonably in attempting
to enforce its dolphin conservation laws unilaterally in the ETP.
6. Consistency with the International System2^ g
The extraterritorial application of the IICA also conflicts with
customary norms of international maritime law as reflected in the 1982 LOSC.
Although the U.S. has not signed the LOSC, it has repeatedly recognized that
the non-seabed portions of the Convention are reflective of customary
international law. 20 7 Accordingly, the President indicated in 1983 that
the U.S. would act in accordance with the non-seabed portions of the
Convention and would "recognize the rights of other states in the waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and
freedoms of the United States . . . under international law" were recognized by
such coastal states. 208
2et The next factor to consider is 'the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international systeis." RESTATEMENT (TURD), supra note 118, at §403(2) (f )
.
2» 7 The LOSC Has not signed "because several »ajor probleis in the Convention's deep seabed lining
provisions are contrary to the interests and principles of industrialized nations and would not help attain the
aspirations of developing countries " Kith regard to the non-seabed portions of the agreeient, the O.S.
stated that "the convention ... contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which
generally confiri existing laritiie law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states."
Statetent on United States Ocean Policy, supra note 35. The LOSC has been signed by 119 states and has been
ratified by sore than 50 states. In accordance with Article 307 of the Convention, it will enter into force
"12 Bonths after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instruient of ratification or accession." Mexico has
ratified the Convention. Panaia is a signatory, but has not yet ratified. Venezuela joined the O.S. in not
signing the Convention. HHP-9, supra note 33.
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The IDCA initially conflicts with the customary norm of flag-state
sovereignty over ships that fly its flag. 209 With limited
exceptions , 2 10 this principle grants the flag-state exclusive jurisdiction
over all administrative, technical and social matters regarding ships that fly
its flag. 211 The IDCA, however, interferes with a flag-state's right to
regulate the fishing practices of its tuna fleet. It is therefore
inconsistent with this customary international law principle.
The IDCA also conflicts with the universally recognized high seas
freedom of fishing. 212 By dictating how a foreign state can fish in the
ETF (including parts of the high seas), the IDCA attempts to subject a part of
the high seas to U.S. sovereignty. This is clearly in violation of customary
international law as reflected in Articles 87 and 89 of the LOSC. 21 ^
Additionally, the IDCA conflicts with the customary law duty to
cooperate in the management and conservation of marine resources in the high
2es Article 91(1) provides that "ships have the nationality of the State Hhose flag they are entitled to
fly." Accord RESTATEMENT (THIBD), supra note 118, at §501.
2ie All states lay exercise jurisdiction over ships engaged in piracy and slave trade regardless of the
flag they are flying. See Articles 99 and 105 of the LOSC.
2
1
1L0SC, Articles 91 and 94(1). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) , supra note 118.
212 Article 87 of the LOSC provides that "the high seas are open to all States .... Preedot of the high
seas ... coiprises, inter alia,: ... freedoi of fishing These freedois shall be exercised by all States
with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedon of the high seas " The
U.S. clearly takes advantage of this freedoi of fishing since lore than 94 percent of the tuna harvested by the
U.S. is caught outside the D.S. EEZ. D.S. IHT'L TRADE COMH'N POB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2. Accord RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 118, at §521.




seas. 214 Such cooperation is particularly important when nationals from
different states "exploit identical ... or different living resources in the
same area . ..." 2 is Under such circumstances, Article 118 of the LOSC
imposes a duty on states "to establish subregional or regional fisheries
organizations ..." and to negotiate adequate conservation measures for the
resources concerned. There is a similar duty to work through appropriate
international organisations in order to conserve and manage marine mammals in
the high seas.216 This requirement for multilateral cooperation in the
management and conservation of marine resources in the high seas is not a new
concept and has been historically recognized by the U.S. 217 To the extent
that the HCA is a uni lateral attempt by the U.S. to regulate dolphin
conservation on the high seas, it is inconsistent with this customary duty to
cooperate
.
znArticle 117 of the LOSC provides that "all States have the duty ... to co-operate with other States in
taking, such leasures for their respective nationals as lay be necessary for the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas."
215LOSC, Article 118.
216L0SC, Article 120.
2 ! 7 Tbis duty to cooperate has been recognized by the U.S. in the Truian Fishery Proclaiation, the BFCBA
,
the 1958 Fishery Convention, the HHPA, and the IATTC Agreeient. For a concurring Soviet vies, see G. Tunkin,
The Geneva Conference on the lav of the Sea, 7 IRT'L AFFAIRE 47-52 (Hoscos) (1958).
50

Finally, the IDCA conflicts with the we11-recognized, albeit recently
established, concept of the EEZ reflected in Part V of the LOSC.216 In the
EEZ, a coastal state has inter alia:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of . . . exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superjacent to the sea-bed . .
. ;
[and]
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this
Convention with regard to: ... (iii) the protection and preservation of




The coastal state shall exercise these rights and duties with "due regard to
the rights and duties of other States . . . ."220
With regard to fish stocks that "occur within the exclusive economic-
zones of two or more coastal States," or 'within the exclusive economic zone
and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone," Article 63 of the LOSC
requires that the states involved negotiate, "either directly or through . .
.
regional organizations," appropriate conservation measures for these stocks.
This duty to negotiate is extended to states that fish for highly migratory
species, such as tuna, to ensure the "optimum utilization of such species ...
both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone." 221 Additionally,
* 18 Today, lore that 80 states, including Mexico, Venezuela and the D.S., claii a 200-iiie EEZ. Another 25
states claii fishery 2ones, 21 of shich extend 200 nautical »iles froi shore. Thirteen other states , including
Panana, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru, claii 200-iile territorial seas. Such claiis, in combination
with the effects of the long negotiating history of, and overwheliing support for (i.e., 119 signatories), the
LOSC, strongly support the position espoused by lany conentators that the EEZ concept is reflective of
custoiary international las as evidenced by state practice. HWP-9 , supra note 33. The O.S. has officially
taken the position that the EEZ concept "is widely regarded as lawful under custoeary international las" and
that "there is already a considerable record of state practice supporting such a conclusion. See U.S. Dept . of
State, Oceans Policy and the Exclusive Econoiic Zone, Bar. 10, 1983, Current Policy Ho. 471. The EEZ concept






Article 65 imposes a duty on all states to cooperate through appropriate
international organizations to conserve marine mammals.
By attempting to regulate fishing practices in the EEZ of other states,
the IDCA specifically violates the sovereign rights and duties of coastal
states to exploit, manage and conserve the marine resources within their
respective EEZs. Additionally, the unilateral nature of the IDCA clearly
violates the duty to cooperate in the negotiation of conservation measures for
the management and protection of highly migratory species (such as tuna and
dolphin) under Article 64.
7. Other States' Interests in the ETP222
The most compelling justification for foreign state regulation in the
ETP, apart from sovereignty concerns and the aforementioned conventional and
customary international law principles, is economic development. Tuna is the
second most important commercial fish product in the world. 223 Since 1960,
world tuna consumption has grown at a rate of seven percent per year, and in
1991, world tuna sales were estimated at over $4.5 billion. 224 One quarter
of this catch, primarily yellowfin tuna, was harvested in the ETP. 225
Therefore, the tuna industry is an attractive option for some of the lesser
developed countries of Latin America to improve their economic status. Both
Mexico and Venezuela have taken advantage of this option and are currently
2 2 2Tbe next factor to consider is "the extent to which another state lay have an interest in regulating
the activity." RESTATEHENT (THIRD) , supra note 118, at §403(2) (g)
.
2230. S. IHT'L TRADE COMB'S PDB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2.
225 H. Parrish, supra note 147.
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operating the two largest purse seine fleets in the ETP. 226 As a result,
they both have a significant interest in regulating the fishing practices of
their respective fleets. Moreover, for Mexico, compliance with the IDCA would
mean a prohibition on tuna fishing throughout its entire EEZ, an area in which
it is authorized by international law to exercise "sovereign rights for the
purpose of . . . exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources ..."
of the zone. 227 Mexico therefore obviously has a paramount interest in
regulating its own fishing activities within the ETP.
In addition, the IDCA completely ignores the treaty obligations of other
states under the IATTC Agreement. 228 These states have a duty under
international law to adopt regulations to implement their obligations under
the agreement. However, such regulations will undoubtedly conflict with the
moratorium requirement of the IDCA. It is therefore unreasonable for the U.S.
to expect foreign state compliance with the IDCA.
8. Likelihood of Conflict22 9
Although Congress apparently believes that the U.S. has authority under
international law to unilaterally apply its dolphin conservation policies
extraterritorial ly, it would appear from the foregoing discussion that many of
the ETP harvesting nations disagree. Conflict over the tuna-dolphin issue is
22e Mexico has over 50 purse seine vessels operating in the ETP; Venezuela has over 25 vessels. J. Brooke,
supra note 8.
22'Fobberson, supra note 179; LOSC, Article 56(1).
22M38 Cong. Rec. B9064-02, B9068 (1992).
225The final factor to consider is "the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state."




therefore inevitable, particularly since most ETP harvesting states have
enacted domestic legislation to protect dolphins and regulate their purse
seine fleets. 23®
This potential for conflict with other states' regulations can be
illustrated by the current embargo against Columbia. In 1992, the NMFS
reviewed Columbia's marine mammal regulatory program. It found that the
program was comparable to the U.S. program. Additionally, IATTC observer
reports indicated that there were no observed dolphin mortalities associated
with the Columbian purse seine fleet during the 1991 fishing season. Despite
these findings, an impDrt ban was still imposed against Columbian yellowfin
tuna. The justification given for the embargo was that "the level of observer
coverage during the period was [only] 40 percent." 231 That figure was
below the 100 percent required by NMFS regulations. 232
The potential for conflict has become more apparent with the adoption of
the IATTC Agreement. A recent incident involving Panama provides an example
of how the potential for conflict has increased. In 1990, yellowfin tuna
harvested by Panamanian pjrse seiners was embargoed under the MMFA. In order
23'Bexico announced its new 10-point dolphin conservation prograe in Septeiber 1991. L. Stauer, supra
note 191. The Mexican prograi focuses on improving current fishing practices as opposed to a total ban on
purse seine fishing. 57 Fed. Reg. 21081 (1992). Venezuela has also enacted tough dolphin conservation
regulations that proiise to reduce incidental lortality by 75 percent. Venezuela: Offensive on ill Fronts
Against U.S. luna Eibargo, supra note 141. Panaia has recently aiended its law6 to coiply with its obligations
under the IATTC Agreesent. This new las allows for the intentional encircleient of dolphins with purse seine
nets. 58 Fed. Reg. 3013 (1993). Costa Rica, Coluibia, Ecuador, France, Guateiala, Vanuatu and the Netherlands
Antilles have also enacted conservation laws to protect dolphins in the purse seine fisheries. I. Holland,
supra note 6, at n.68; 55 Fed. Reg. 11921 (1990); 57 Fed. Reg. 17857 (1992).
23 Secondary enbargoes sill also be iiposed against intereediary nations that do not provide the required
certification that they have banned yellowfin tuna iiports froi Coluebia. 57 Fed. Reg. 17857 (1992).
23257 Fed. Reg. 668 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 17857 (1992). Note that the original HBFS regulations only
required 33 percent observer coverage.
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to lift the embargo, Panama enacted a law- Presidential Decree No. Ill- which
prohibited the intentional encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets. In
January 1992, the embargo was lifted by the U.S. However, in order to comply
with its obligations under the IATTC Agreement, Panama modified Presidential
Decree No. Ill on October 20, 1992. The new law- Presidential Decree No. 70-
allows "Panamanian purse seine vessels operating under the . . . IATTC dolphin
mortality program to intentionally deploy their nets on . . . marine mammals."
As a result of this change in the law and reports by observers that Panamanian
vessels had used purse seine nets to intentionally encircle dolphins on two
successive trips, an embargo was re- imposed against Panamanian yellowfin tuna
in January 1993. 233
Both of these cases graphically illustrate the reality of conflict
between the IDCA and the dolphin conservation laws of other nations. In the
first example, the U.S. imposed an import ban even though there was no
evidence of dolphin mortality associated with the purse seine fleet. In the
second example, the U.S. has penalized a nation for complying with its
international obligations. Unquestionably, such results are unreasonable.
This is clearly one of those situations in which the U.S. should limit "the
exercise of jurisdiction so as to minimize conflict with the jurisdiction of
other states .... "234
233 Secondary embargoes sill also be iiposed against intenediary nations that do not provide tbe required
certification indicating that they have banned the iiport of yellowfin tuna froi Panaia. 58 Fed. Reg. 3013
(1993).
23< The Restateaent provides that "When regulation of transnational activity is based on its effects in the
territory of the regulating state, the principle of reasonableness calls for li»iting the exercise of
jurisdiction so as to liniiize conflict with the jurisdiction of other states, particularly with the state
where the act takes place." RESTATEMENT ( THIRD) , supra note 118, at §403, Reporters' Note 3.
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9. Who Has the Greater Interest?
Even if a U.S. court were to reach the untenable conclusion that the
IDCA is a reasonable application of extraterritorial jurisdiction under
§403(2), the Restatement still requires the application of a balancing test to
determine which state has the greatest interest in regulating fishing
activities in the ETF.23 5 On the one hand, the U.S. has an interest in
saving 75,000 dolphins over the next six years and achieving a dolphin-safe
tuna market in the U.S. On the other hand, ETP harvesting states have an
interest, in improving their economic and social status (through the continued
use of purse seine nets to harvest tuna) and complying with their treaty
obligations under the IATTC Agreement. Upon weighing those interests, it is
obvious that the commercial, legal and political needs of the ETP harvesting
nations are clearly paramount. Accordingly, the U.S. should defer to the
greater interests of the ETP harvesting states in this instance.
VII. SUMMARY: A Proposed Solution
The IDCA has been justified on the ground that "the past strategy of
trying to reduce dolphin mortality while continuing to fish for tuna in
association with dolphin is no longer sufficient." 236 In light of the
overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary and the economic and social
235§403( 3 ) f the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) provides:
When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a
person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an
obligation to evaluate its own as sell as the other state's interest in exercising
jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors. Subsection (2); a state should defer to
the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
236138 Cong. Rec. S17840-05 , 17841 (1992); 138 Cong. Fee. S10135, S10136 (1992).
56

needs of the ETP harvesting nations to continue purse seine fishing, such a
position is untenable. The moratorium , in particular, is not based on
scientific fact and is , hence , an unreasonable demand to place on nations that
rely heavily on the ETF tuna fishery to enhance their economic and social
well-being. 237 Moreover, the unilateral nature of the IDCA violates nearly
every conventional and customary norm of maritime law with respect to fishery
management and conservation, as well as U.S. treaty obligations under the
GATT. The IDCA, therefore, does not provide an appropriate nor reasonable
solution to the tuna-dolphin problem in the ETP. A proper balance between the
U.S. interest in protecting dolphins and the ETF' harvesting nations' interest
in maintaining a viable tuna industry by fishing in the ETF' can only be
achieved through implementation of the IATTC Agreement and the DPCIA dolphin-
safe regime.
Implementation of the IATTC Agreement will immediately eliminate any
Potential conflicts with the other nine states that have joined the agreement.
Sovereignty concerns will be accommodated and claims of U.S. unilateralism
will be precluded. In addition, implementation of the IATTC Agreement will
bring the U.S. back into compliance with its obligations under the GATT. More
importantly, compliance with the IATTC Agreement comports with the basic tenet
of fishery management of highly migratory species- that is, multilateral
miiote that the proponents of the IDCA acknowledge that "the overall viability of dolphin populations are
not endangered ..." by the use of purse seine nets and that safeguards "currently in place guarantee that this
will continue to be the case." 138 Cong. Rec. S10135, S10136 (1992); 138 Cong. Bee. H9064-02, B9068 (1992).
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cooperation throughout the range of the stock. Without such cooperation, any
effort to manage and conserve highly migratory species will fail. 238
Implementation of the DPCIA regime allows the American consumer to
decide if the U.S. tuna market should be dolphin-safe. 239 It is a proven
regime that has already resulted in an U.S. tuna market that is virtually
dolphin-safe. 240 It has additionally encouraged research into alternative
means of harvesting tuna that do not involve the intentional setting on
dolphins. 241 In the end, it will be the buying power of the American
consumer, and not unilateral measures by Congress, that will have the greatest
impact on the foreign purse seine fleets. 242 In the meantime, the IATTC
Agreement promises to significantly reduce dolphin mortality to levels




'This theie was also emphasized by a National Acadeay of Sciences study. The report found "that the
best way for the United States to address the tuna/dolphin issue was to work cooperatively with the other
fishing nations of the region to reduce the incidental take of dolphins." G. Randy, Congress dulls Fishing
Ban, San Diego Daily Transcript, Jul. 22, 1992, at Al.
239 i?ecaii that the DPCIA labelling provisions were reviewed by the O.S. -Mexico dispute panel and were
found to be consistent with the GATT. See note 67.
2<*Even Greenpeace has indicated that the processors' dolphin-safe policy is "the biggest steps that could
be taken in order to preserve dolphins in the ETP in . . . the last 20 to 30 years." 2 funa Canners Shun Fishing
That Snares dolphins, supra note 159.
2<i0.S. INT'L THADE COHH'N PDB. Ho. 2547, supra note 2.
2 4 2138 Cong. Pec. S10135, S10136 (1992).
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